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INFORMATION OVERLOAD, MULTI-TASKING, AND THE SOCIALLY 
NETWORKED JURY: WHY PROSECUTORS SHOULD APPROACH THE 
MEDIA GINGERLY 
By Andrew E. Taslitz 
Abstract 
The rise of computer technology, the internet, rapid news dissemination, multi-tasking, 
and social networking have wrought changes in human psychology that alter how we process 
news media. More specifically, news coverage of high-profile trials necessarily focuses on 
emotionally-overwrought, attention-grabbing information disseminated to a public having little 
ability to process that information critically. The public’s capacity for empathy is likewise 
reduced, making it harder for trial processes to overcome the unfair prejudice created by the 
high-profile trial. Market forces magnify these changes. Free speech concerns limit the ability of 
the law to alter media coverage directly, and the tools available to trial judges to minimize harm 
to trial fairness are toothless.  The usual solution has been lawyers’ ethics rules designed to 
channel their communications with the press, particularly rules focusing on prosecutors. 
This piece addresses these concerns, using a recent proposed revision to the American 
Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function as a jumping off point 
for the discussion. Those Standards, like most state ethics rules, prohibit prosecutors from 
making “public statements that the prosecutor reasonably should know will have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding.” Drawing on cognitive science, 
behavioral economics, rumor-transmission studies, and jury research, this article argues that a 
substantial likelihood of material prejudice to criminal proceedings from prosecutor statements 
to the press will always be present in high profile cases. Accordingly, the rules generally 
governing prosecutor dealings with the press, including the latest version of those rules 
embodied in the proposed Standards, are unrealistic. Better rules are theoretically possible. 
Nevertheless, this article concludes, such rules are not politically realistic. Accordingly, this 
piece recommends modest changes to the proposed standards’ commentary to alert prosecutors 
to the true nature of the risks arising from their contact with the media and recommending 
prosecutor training and internal and external accountability mechanisms to improve prosecutor 
performance in this area. 
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Information Overload, Multi-tasking, and the Socially Networked Jury: Why Prosecutors 
Should Approach the Media Gingerly 
Andrew E. Taslitz* 
I. Introduction 
This article will argue that changes in technology and American culture create reasons for all 
prosecutors to be even more cautious than was true in the past in interacting with the media. 
Many of my comments could apply to defense counsel as well, but my focus here is on 
prosecutors, both because of my limited space and my belief that they are the actors whose word 
is likely to have the greatest impact on the public. More specifically, this article will raise doubts 
about the effectiveness of the proposed American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for 
the Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.7, entitled, “Relationship with the Media.” The core 
provision of that standard reads as follows: 
(c) A prosecutor should not make or authorize the making of a 
public statement that the prosecutor reasonably should know will 
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal 
proceeding or unnecessarily heightening public condemnation of the 
accused, except for statements that are necessary to inform the 
public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s or law 
enforcement actions and which serves a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose (and subject to any exceptions in an applicable judicial rule 
or rule of professional conduct).1  
                                               
*Professor, Howard University School of Law; former Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA.; B.A., 1978, 
Queens College; J.D., 1981, University of Pennsylvania Law School. My appreciation goes to the Howard 
University School of Law for its support of this project and to my research assistants, Mahlet Ayalew, Melissa 
Crespo, Francine Foote, and Sandi Pessin-Boyd for their outstanding assistance.  
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This provision alters the current standard in two ways: first, by adding the word 
“material” before the word “prejudice” (a standard that would seem to make it easier to talk to 
the media because it is harder to prove “material” prejudice than any prejudice whatsoever); 
second, by adding to the prohibition against unreasonably creating a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding a second prohibition, namely on “unnecessarily 
heightening public condemnation of the accused.”2 In most cases, these new standards would 
present no problem because media coverage of most criminal cases is non-existent or minimal.3  
But in high-profile cases, these standards are unduly optimistic because media coverage 
will almost invariably create a substantial likelihood of “materially prejudicing a criminal 
proceeding” and of unnecessarily heightening condemnation of the accused. That does not 
necessarily mean that the standard should be changed because there are free speech concerns that 
are largely beyond the scope of this paper (though I will address them briefly in this article’s 
conclusion). Instead, this paper’s focus is solely on the risk to a fair trial.4 That risk is 
unavoidable. Prosecutors should not add to it and should therefore be cautious. At a minimum, 
therefore, comments to the proposed standard should urge such caution and explain the reasons 
justifying it. The standard is, after all, an aspirational one, offering guidance rather than 
punishable dictates on prosecutor behavior. 
                                                                                                                                                       
1
 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO STANDARDS FOR 
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.7(c) (Draft as of June 2010). 
2
 See id. at 16 (separately reciting the language of the current standard, drafted in 1993, and the proposed new 
standard). It should be noted that current Rule 3.8(f), AM BAR ASS’N MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, also 
contains a general prohibition on “making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening 
public condemnation of the accused,” but that language does not appear in the current Standards for the Prosecution 
Function, which, along with the proposed revisions to those standards, are the subject of this symposium. 
3
 See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why the Fair Trial/Free Press Paradigm 
Doesn’t Cut It Anymore, in RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 175, 
182-83 (Michael Seigel ed. 2009) [hereinafter Free Press]. 
4
 Although the standards extend to impacts on a “criminal proceeding,” I focus solely on the impact on a fair trial 
here.  If unacceptable prejudice would occur at trial, it is likely also to infect trial alternatives, such as a guilty plea, 
and many pretrial activities.  Even where this is not necessarily so, however, the analysis for a fair trial can readily 
be applied to other stages of a criminal proceeding, such as suppression motion hearings. 
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After this Introduction, Part II of this article explains that our fast-paced, high-
technology, multi-tasking, information overloading world makes it far more likely that audiences 
will evaluate news media emotionally rather than critically and will be drawn to extreme 
versions of the news.  This observation is based on research concerning the impact of 
information overload on cognitive functioning.  Part II will further explain why and how the 
news media caters to these tendencies in ways that lead to error, error likely to be slanted against 
criminal defendants. 
Part III examines why these same technological and cultural changes reduce the 
likelihood of sustained, deep, critical thought generally, particularly in the case of crime news 
stories.  Such reduced ability to fairly evaluate the credibility and weight of media reports makes 
it more unlikely that false or misleading statements will be challenged, truthful ones placed in 
proper context, or counterarguments and counter-interpretations fairly considered.  Somewhat 
more speculatively, there is also reason to worry that technological and cultural changes are 
impairing Americans’ on-average capacity for empathy – for fully understanding another’s 
thoughts, feelings, and situation – a prerequisite for judging them fairly.5  Much news also 
spreads by, and is interpreted through the process of, rumor-transmission.  Yet the rise of the 
internet amplifies the speed and scope of rumor, while increasing its capacity for fostering error.6  
A less-critical, less empathetic audience is even less likely to spot these errors, as Part III further 
explains. Finally, Part III reviews psychological research on pretrial publicity’s impact on juries, 
research that further supports the risks to critical thinking and feeling already reviewed. Yet that 
research likely undervalues the likely risks as rising generations raised on the internet and the 
quickening pace of technology make the dangers to trial fairness all the greater. 
                                               
5
 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination and Social Norms in 
Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 419, 431-41 (2009) [hereinafter Tinkerbell]. 
6
 See Taslitz, Free Press, supra note 3, at 182; infra text accompanying notes 247 - 253. 
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Part IV, the conclusion, briefly reviews, however, countervailing concerns, such as free 
speech, promoting sound democratic governance, responding to defense media coverage, 
correcting inaccurate media reports, and overcoming pre-existing public biases that favor 
prosecutor access to the press. Though this section is necessarily short given what can be 
accomplished in a brief article, this section offers support for retaining the unavoidably flawed 
core standard protecting the right to a fair trial but expanding the commentary to reflect the 
concerns noted here and endorsing changes beyond those recited in the standards that are 
necessary to improve prosecutor use of the press. Those changes include better prosecutorial 
training and enhanced methods for maintaining prosecutorial transparency and accountability. 
The conclusion also addresses some more minor drafting concerns.    
I want to emphasize that I am no Luddite. Technology and the complexities of the 
modern world have many benefits, including for criminal justice. But in the area of media 
coverage, the risks to a fair trial are greater than ever before. Offering a fuller appreciation of 
those risks is my primary goal here.  
II. Information Overload and its Companions 
A. A Day Spent in Overdrive  
Consider the typical day of a middle-aged married male lawyer with two kids.7  He awakes to 
music, perhaps from the ipod plugged into his wireless clock.  He immediately checks his email 
on his home computer, then rushes downstairs to help to feed the kids and get them ready for 
school while a television set playing cartoons blares in the background.  Once the kids are off, he 
drives to the train, again listening to music on his ipod while talking on his hands-free cell phone 
                                               
7
 The example is my own but is inspired by the more detailed example offered in JACK FULLER, WHAT IS 
HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE CRISIS IN JOURNALISM 58-59 (2010).  Fuller’s book 
is the first work to explore the cognitive implications of information overload for the implosion of traditional news 
media and thus more generally inspired Part II of this article. 
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to young associates and early-rising clients. On the train, he uses his ipad to review background 
materials helpful for an upcoming deposition. At work, he edits a draft brief while listening to 
music but with periodic interruptions from calls or text messages on his cell phone and from 
emails and instant messages from clients who expect instant responses. He may also have 
programmed his laptop to interrupt him if there is pressing news about the world, and he may 
periodically glance at it to check out professional news feeds to keep him abreast of the latest 
developments in his areas of practice. His day is punctuated with meetings where he and others 
will check messages on their Blackberrys and conference calls that permit him to web surf or 
even edit a draft direct examination during each call. After a full day, on the ride home he relaxes 
by reading book excerpts on his ipad and again listening to music. Madness ensues when he 
returns home: multiple television sets playing, one kid needing a ride to a recital, another to a 
friend’s house, a brief moment of “peace” with his equally exhausted spouse until the kids return 
home, a peace likely used to get ready for the next day’s professional challenges by working on a 
laptop but perhaps at a more measured pace as a favorite television show plays in the 
background, though interruptions recur, much like those during the working day. 
His children in some ways lead still more frantic lives.  They have grown up in this multi-
tasking, multi-media, fast-paced world of limited attention spans and information overload.8 
They crave it. Unlike their middle-aged parents, these kids obsess about social networking sites, 
spending far more time on Facebook and MySpace interacting with scores or hundreds of 
“friends” than with in-person connection.9 If they want to relate to one individual or a small 
group, they text one another rather than using the cell phone.10 They may indeed rarely even 
                                               
8
 See LARRY D. ROSEN, REWIRED: UNDERSTANDING THE iGENERATION AND THE WAY THEY LEARN, 28-29 (2010). 
9
 See id. at 28-32. 
10
 See id. at 14-15, 35-37. 
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answer their cellphones, unless the call is from mom or dad.11 They text as obsessively as they 
network. Uni-tasking bores them.12 They do their homework while posting to their network sites, 
texting friends, listening to music, watching television, and googling interesting topics, much of 
this simultaneously or with quick task-switching.13 Parents must fight with the kids to get them 
to complete their homework faster and to get them to read books from start to finish, with full 
engagement and no distractions.14 Parents lose these fights, as do teachers.15 Older teens today 
spend about twenty-one hours daily using technology.16 Obviously, they are not sleeping only 
three hours per night and ditching school every day. This extraordinary number reflects the 
remarkable degree of their multi-tasking. 
B.  Consequences of Overdrive: A First Look 
1. Affective Consequences 
Information overload, time pressure, and frequent interruptions create problems for our 
limited brains.17  Our working memory can generally handle no more than about seven units of 
information at a time.18  Lengthy and difficult training can perhaps expand that limit by a 
                                               
11
 See id. 36-37. 
12
 See id. at 2-3. 
13
 See id. at 28; Larry D. Rosen, Adolescents in MySpace: The State of Our Nation’s Youth: 2008-09 (Horatio Alger 
Ass’n 2008); Larry D. Rosen, et al., The Association of Parenting Style and Child Age with Parental Limit Setting 
and Adolescent MySpace Behavior,29  J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCH. 459, 459-71 (2008); D. TAPSCOTT, GROWN UP 
DIGITAL: HOW THE NET GENERATION IS CHANGING YOUR WORLD 9 (2009). 
14
 See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 30-32, 33-35. 
15
 See id. at 75-76. 
16
 See id. at 28-30; E.A. Vandewater, et al., Digital Childhood: Electronic Media and Technology Use Among 
Infants, Toddlers, and Pre-Schoolers, 119 (5) PEDIATRICS 1006-15 (2007).  For analyses of media usage by other 
age groups as well, see NPD Group, Kids Ages 12-14 Consume Digital Content on a Device between Three and 
Seven Times Per Month, http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_080115.html (January 15, 2009); A Mindlin, 
Preferring the Web Over Watching TV, N.Y. TIMES, August 25, 2008, 
;http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/technology/25drill.html; HORATIO ALGER ASS’N OF DISTINGUISHED 
AMERICANS, THE STATE OF OUR NATION’S YOUTH 2008-09, 
http://www.horatioalger.org/pdfs/0708SONY.pdf (2008). 
17
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 60-61. 
18
 See id. at 63; see generally TORKEL KLINGBERG, THE OVERFLOWING BRAIN: INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE 
LIMITS OF WORKING MEMORY (2009)(detailing the largely negative impact of modern-day information overload and 
multi-tasking on working memory and the implications for cognitive performance and emotional state). 
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maximum of two data bits in some individuals.19 In a complex world, many things scream for 
our attention. But our attention is a scarce resource, requiring some means for us to economize 
on it.20 This economy of attention operates more at an often subconscious emotional level than a 
conscious intellectual one, particularly under circumstances of cognitive overload.21 
Thus multi-tasking and information overload encourage greater reliance on stereotyping 
and emotional cues in judging and deciding how to react to other persons.22 Severe time pressure 
leads its victims to experience negative emotions, in turn focusing primarily on negative rather 
than positive information.23 Interruption alone can cause emotional arousal,24 but the 
combination of all these factors leads to still greater arousal.25 “Arousal” is a type of attention 
that focuses on nothing in particular but rather is “a general heightening of perception and the 
feeling of awareness.”26 Intense arousal constitutes stress.27 The greater the degree of cognitive 
demands, the greater the intensity of emotional arousal.28 The aroused brain is more prone to 
certain kinds of judgment errors.29 It is also more prone to focus on specific environmental 
stimuli --  to select what aspects of the world merit greater attention – based upon their emotional 
intensity.30  
                                               
19
 See KLINBERG, supra note 18, at 121-24. 
20
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 63-64. 
21
 See id.; RICHARD LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION: STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE AGE OF 
INFORMATION (2007); THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C. BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY (2002). 
22
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 61; Gordon H. Bower & Jordan P. Forgas, Affect Memory and Social Cognition, in, 
COGNITION AND EMOTION 141 (Eric Eich, et al. ed.s 2000). 
23
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 61; Anne Edland & Ola Svenson, Judgment and Decision Making under Time 
Pressure: Studies and Findings, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 27, 
28 (Anne Edland & Ola Svenson ed.s ); John A. Maule & G. Robert J. Hockey, State, Stress, and Time Pressure, in 
TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 86 (Anne Edland & Ola Svenson ed.s). 
24
 See GEORGE MANDLER, MIND AND BODY: PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION AND STRESS 171(1984). 
25
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 61-62. 
26
 Id. at 60; see KLINBERG, supra note 18, at 20-22. 
27
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 60. 
28
 See id; KLINBERG, supra note 18, at 20-22. 
29
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 60-61. 
30
 See id. at 60-62; JOHN J. RATEY, A USER’S GUIDE TO THE BRAIN: PERCEPTION, ATTENTION, AND THE FOUR 
THEATRES OF THE BRAIN 121 (2002) (noting that by the time the brain is conscious of a sensation, “the amygdala 
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The problem is complicated by the phenomenon of habituation.31 Much like some drug 
addicts, the appeal of continued exposure to the same emotionally intense information fades over 
time. The emotion addict needs a stronger fix.32 Only the ever-more emotionally intense aspects 
of the environment are able to grab the addict’s attention.33 Information failing to meet this 
criterion is ignored, leaving us attention-blind, as if the information never existed.34 Those who 
want our attention must try ever-harder. In a world where distraction, sensory inundation, and 
task-switching are almost ever-present, emotional arousal will run especially high.35 That in turn 
means that competition for our attention will become increasingly fierce via the low-road tools of 
appealing to the amygdala, a critical brain structure for marking information based upon its 
emotional appeal.36 If not all Americans so react, the average reaction of the average American 
to our high-technology world is surely tipping toward the world of arousal. Market competition 
in the economy of attention is thus affective, rather than intellectual, warfare. 
2. Media Structure 
In days gone by, audiences had few technological sources for news. There were three 
national television stations, maybe one or two additional local ones in major cities. But cable and 
the rise of the internet have led to a vast multiplication of potential news sources.37 Round-the-
clock cable news stations compete with network news,  both in turn competing with on-line 
publications, blogs, social networking sites, electronic bulletin boards, news “apps,” and a host 
                                                                                                                                                       
has already branded it with a raw emotional valence somewhere along the continuum from mildly interesting to ‘oh 
my God!’”). 
31
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 71 (summarily defining habituation); MARK JOHNSON, THE MEANING OF THE BODY: 
AESTHETICS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 34-35 (2007) (defining habituation and its underlying processes in more 
depth). 
32
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 71. 
33
 See id. at 71-72. 
34
 See id.  
35
 See id. at 60-62, 71-73. 
36
 See id. at 40, 47, 49-55 (analyzing the amygdala’s role and the role of emotions more generally in governing the 
economy of attention); JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF 
EMOTIONAL LIFE 157-69  (1996) (explaining the cognitive and emotional “low” and “high” roads). 
37
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 65-67. 
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of other options.38 Increased competition means that producers must give the consumers more of 
what the latter want.39 But wants, including for news, are diverse. One way to compete, 
therefore, is to alter programming to appeal to market segments.40 This market fragmentation 
means news specialization. Thus Fox News offers a conservative slant, MSNBC a moderately 
liberal one, the Huffington Post a progressive one. Audience fragmentation in which we each 
watch primarily the news with which we already are likely to agree leads to group polarization. 
Group polarization is a phenomenon in which like-minded members of groups, hearing 
only from persons already agreeing with them, become increasingly extreme in their views.41 
There are several likely causes of this growing polarization. First, the argument pool becomes 
limited. Group members are simply never exposed to contrary views.42 Second, individuals tend 
to like those who are most similar to them.43 Moreover, we are a “groupish” species, looking for 
ways to distinguish “us” from “them,” with “us” being somehow superior.44 To be more accepted 
by the group as a whole requires increasingly energetic efforts to craft reasons for agreeing with 
the group’s views and ways more sharply to distinguish the group from outsiders.45 Views thus 
                                               
38
 See id.  
39
 See id. at 69-70. 
40
 See id.; Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, http://www.ssrn.com (2004) (two 
economists’ predicting that increased competition for news readers leads to market fragmentation if audience beliefs 
are diverse). 
41
 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 11-14 (2003) [hereinafter DISSENT]. There are ways to 
overcome the ill effects of group polarization, but they require careful design and implementation of decision 
making procedures in a way unlikely to arise from ordinary market competition. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness 
Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, 4  CARDOZO J. PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS 271 
(2006) [hereinafter Democratic Deliberation]. 
42
 See SUNSTEIN, DISSENT, supra note 41, at 120-21. 
43
 See id. at (“If individual [group] members perceive one another as friendly, likable, and similar to themselves, the 
size and likelihood of the [polarization] shift will increase.”); Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 5, at 433 (analyzing the 
general psychology of liking similar persons). 
44
 See DAVID BERREBY, US & THEM 67, 129-332, 206-09, 232 (2005). 
45
 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 122-24, 129-31. 
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tend to become more extreme. Media outlets, to appeal to their relevant markets, must, therefore, 
also become more extreme.46 
When this tendency toward market segmentation and group polarization is combined 
with an audience selling its attention only for an ever-increasingly-intense emotional appeal, 
media are forced into “an emotional arms race.”47 As Pulitzer prize-winning former Chicago 
Tribune publisher Jack Fuller puts it, “[t]he aroused brain might be drawn to a neo-populist 
commentator ranting about illegal immigration, a film clip of an explosion ripping, or – turning 
to humor to regulate a surfeit of emotion – a comedian delivering a satire on the day’s news.”48  
Concludes Fuller:  
Emotional presentation succeeds across all class lines and has 
attained wide legitimacy. The curve has shifted toward emotional 
presentation. As bandwidth increases and the cost of computing drops, 
message immersion will continue to increase, and with it a further shift 
of the curve. We may only be at the beginning of the process.49 
3. Sources of Judgment Error 
If the news that we receive is increasingly slanted, often portraying only one side of the 
picture fully, and if it relies on emotional intensity more than cognitive content to grab our 
attention, it would seem at first blush sound to assume that audiences would eventually catch on. 
Our high-tech world does not, despite some of its ill consequences, render us all stupid.50 Indeed, 
it makes more views available in total if only we would spend the time to examine them fairly.51 
Unfortunately, a variety of human reasoning processes, many of them unconscious, suggest that 
                                               
46
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 69. 
47
 See id. at 71. 
48
 See id. 
49
 Id. at 73. 
50
 For arguments, a subset of which are refuted here, that the net does much cognitive good, see STEVEN JOHNSON, 
EVERYTHING BAD IS GOOD FOR YOU (2006). 
51
 See REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2009). 
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most of us either will not see the problem, will not care about it, and will not put in the energy to 
correct it. 
Notably, the confirmation bias – the tendency to seek and retain evidence and arguments 
that confirm our pre-existing beliefs – means that we often filter out contradicting evidence.52 
Furthermore, our powers of self-deception are enormous.53 If we reach a decision on purely 
irrational grounds, that creates a sense of “cognitive dissonance” with our understanding of 
ourselves as rational beings.54 Accordingly, we confabulate a rationalization, a seemingly 
rational explanation for the arguably irrational.55 For example, many of us have a tendency to 
favor items on the right over those on the left.56 Accordingly, a chooser might favor the cup of 
coffee on the right over that on the left. But the chooser will never admit to himself that he just 
likes things on the right better, so he comes up with a detailed explanation of why the right-
placed coffee is richer tasting, sweeter-smelling than the left-placed coffee.57 Similarly, 
individuals will insist that emotional appeals have nothing to do with their choice of news and 
that the media has little impact on them, crafting alternative explanations for their behavior.58 
They may also display “third party effects,” agreeing that media manipulation may work on 
others but not on themselves.59 That denial, of course, makes it harder for them to overcome the 
                                               
52
 See Peter Goldie, Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World, in THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY 
PHILOSOPHERS ON EMOTION 99-100 (Robert C. Solomon ed. 2004) (defining and explaining the confirmation bias); 
FULLER, supra note 7, at 183 (applying confirmation bias to the media context). 
53
 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 381 
(2005). 
54
 See KAREN A. DILL, HOW FANTASY BECOMES REALITY: SEEING THROUGH MEDIA INFLUENCE 21-23 (2009) 
(defining and explaining cognitive dissonance). 
55
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 76 (explaining application of a similar process to media news reports). 
56
 See DILL, supra note 54, at 29. 
57
 See id. (offering a similar example but involving choosing panty hose); see generally SHEENA IYENGAR, THE 
ART OF CHOOSING (2010) (exploring the psychology of choosing). 
58
 See DILL, supra note 54, at 21-25. This observation follows from the broader point that we rationalize our 
emotions as well as our choices.  See FULLER, supra note 7, at 76 (“[B]ecause the pattern-making, contradiction-
avoiding brain has a gift for rationalizing, it will usually make up a reason for any feeling it has and believe it, at 
least consciously.”). 
59
 See DILL, supra note 54, at 10. 
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very manipulation to which the media subjects them.60 Cognitive dissonance could be resolved 
by means other than rationalization but that “would require real strength – strength of character, 
strength of intellect, and the strength to make real social change.”61 It would also require serious 
education and training in how to overcome these biases. 
The “fundamental attribution error” also plays a role.62 This error is our tendency to 
attribute outcomes more to an individual’s character than to his situation.63 This error makes it 
more likely that observers will attribute a theft to the purported thief’s tainted character than to 
his starving because the Great Recession drove his firm out of business.64  As Walter Lippmann 
put it long before the research had given the phenomenon a name, “To many simple and 
frightened minds there was no political reverse, no strike, no obstruction, no mysterious death or 
mysterious conflagration anywhere in the world of which the causes did not wind back 
to…personal sources of evil.”65  
This error can be particularly egregious because of our tendency to make holistic 
judgments about character based upon one trait and to form impressions concerning that trait 
based upon only the flimsiest of evidence.66 Hearing a rumor that a neighbor has engaged in a 
single act of unkindness might thus result in perceiving that neighbor as irredeemably cruel. The 
error is also magnified by high states of arousal, including fear.67 Subconscious fear based upon 
race, such as black skin color, thus results in a particularly extreme phenomenon, the “ultimate 
                                               
60
 See id. at 22-23. 
61
 Id. at 23.  
62
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L. REV. 1, 6 -9 (1991) [hereinafter Myself Alone]. 
67
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fundamental attribution error” in which an actor’s race becomes the basis for attributing to him 
an evil character.68  
A related error is “misguided parsimony,” reducing the causes of complex events to a 
single cause.69 It is easier to blame either Alan Greenspan or foolish mortgage purchasers for the 
Great Recession than to blame multiple, complex, and ambiguous causes.70 Time-pressured 
journalists thus often favor this oversimplification, knowing that their audience will buy into it, 
especially if the simplification is consistent with the audience’s pre-existing views.71 
Novelty is a better attention-grabber than the familiar.72 Additionally, harmful events are 
more memorable than helpful ones.73 Our greater attention to the negative over the positive 
likely has evolutionary roots.74 Not seeing the poisonous snake may kill us instantly while not 
seeing the juicy piece of fruit at worst leaves us (perhaps temporarily) hungry.75 Media thus push 
novel, negative stories over positive ones, slanting story content and painting an inaccurate, 
usually more frightening than is justified, picture of the world.76 No matter how much audiences 
may bemoan the dearth of positive news stories, they are more readily drawn to the negative. As 
one ex-reporter admitted, “when the nine o’clock news comes on television and a live report 
showing the dome lights of the hook and ladders flashing and the flames licking out an upstairs 
window, I do not turn the channel.”77 
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 See id. at 7 - 8. 
69
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 76. 
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In highly emotional situations, our ability to reason probabilistically is also 
compromised.78 Vivid, concrete descriptions of suffering trigger such emotional states.79 Thus, 
law students evaluating the risk of developing cancer from small amounts of arsenic in water 
were willing to pay vastly more to eliminate that risk when given descriptions of the cancer as 
“very gruesome and intensely painful” and “eat[ing] away at the internal organs of the body” 
than were law students not given such descriptions.80 Yet both groups of students were given 
identical data on the low probabilities of developing the cancer.81 Emotionally vivid information 
is simply more readily available for cognitive processing than is less vivid information, and it is 
thus the more vivid, though not necessarily the more useful, information on which we prefer to 
rely.82 
“Framing effects,” using emotionally powerful language or images that trigger a certain 
perspective on a problem, also alter perceptions.83 Describing someone protesting the use of 
racial epithets as a “censor” rather than a loving egalitarian triggers images of jack-booted thugs 
crushing freedoms rather than of freedom fighters exercising rights to counter-speech.84 Framing 
effects can lead to decisions based on shallow, “peripheral” routes to persuasion rather than the 
“central” routes relying on message content and the quality of argument.85  
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their knowledge of this strategy to further their political agendas). 
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84
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The “representativeness” heuristic leads us to make judgments based upon our beliefs 
about the qualities of what we have been taught are representative members of the group, even if 
our judgments are irrational.86 A perceiver may thus be asked whether a woman who is a liberal, 
a fan of the Grateful Dead, and an advocate for legalizing marijuana is more likely a political 
reporter than a local one. Many perceivers are likely to choose “political reporter” because the 
woman sounds like their notion of someone representative of at least progressive reporters.87 Yet 
there are likely far more local reporters than political ones, so the probabilities are just the 
opposite.88  
Memory affects attention too. We are less likely to remember pallid positive information 
than vivid negative information, thus making it easier to retrieve the latter to guide impression-
formation and decision making.89 We are, however, not only bad at accurately remembering the 
past but equally bad at predicting the future.90 Therefore, we may overestimate the future effect 
of certain events on our future happiness, particularly negative ones that arguably involve giving 
up that which we already have.91 Media play to these fears as well.92 
Logical forms of argument are also less gripping than arguments framed as stories.93 We 
are story-telling creatures.94 Stories define our personal identities, our conceptions of whom we 
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can trust, our understandings of how the world works.95 But stories necessarily require selectivity 
about reporting observed experiences and conformity with the dictates of dramatization.96 There 
must be heroes and villains, winners and losers.  Stories require characters that come alive, 
emotional tension, and clear plot lines.97 Stories also turn on intentions, something hard to judge 
from limited information.98 Stories can trigger powerful emotions in the audience and teach 
moral lessons.  They require use of the imagination.99 Stories are not false because they involve 
narrative.  One story can be more or less true than another.100 But where information is lacking, 
reporters may readily turn to, and listeners respond to, stock stories (typical ones) rather than 
individualized ones.101 Stories about real people are thus reduced to stereotypes.102 Moreover, if 
the stories are about crime, as so many are (remember our obsession with the negative), the 
audience will expect and receive information about the “bad guys,” usually meaning the 
suspect.103 Where there is a dearth of information about character and intentions, the media will 
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suggest some, or audiences will assume some.104 Much of this information can be conveyed 
subconsciously and indirectly, through language choice (“perpetrator”), relative exposure to 
minority races as supposed evildoers, and selectivity in what evidence is reported, what not.105 
Stories partly have their appeal because of “mirror neurons.”106 If we see or hear another 
suffering, neurons fire that simulate the victim’s suffering as our own.107 The two experiences 
are, of course, not identical, but they are sufficiently similar that watching suffering can cause 
many of us pain and anger at pain seen as undeserved.108 The power of our imagination allows us 
to empathize with real and imagined persons alike (we cry at the mother’s pain at her child’s loss 
in  a movie scene).109 Coverage that stresses crime victims’ pain thus encourages empathy for the 
victim at anger at his or her presumed assailant.110  
A variety of social forces also seem to be eroding trust in experts, including expert 
opinion reported in the news.111 Many debate the reasons for this declining trust.112 Some of it 
may involve the media’s own reporting of the supposed frequent failures of many of our social 
and political institutions.113 Some of it may be due to a postmodern skepticism that there are any 
value-free “right” answers to most questions.114 Perhaps we are simply in an anti-elitist cyclical 
                                               
104
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 120-26 (discussing how the news media, while striking a pose of objectivity, often 
suggest knowledge of that which they cannot know, such as a suspect’s mental state, in the name of telling a good 
story); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 66, at 84, 94 - 96 (discussing the process by which jurors fill in missing 
information to make stories seem coherent). 
105
 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 83, 85-86 (discussing language choice and racial imagery); SURETTE, supra note 
103 (discussing selectivity in reporting). 
106
 See Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 5, at 446. 
107
 See id. at 446-51. 
108
 See id. 
109
 See id. 
110
 See id.; FULLER, supra note 7, at 117-18, 129 (discussing how news stories promote empathy with particular 
characters). 
111
 See id. at 87-88, 96-98. 
112
 See id. at 88. 
113
 See id. 
114
 See id. at 91 (“Perception is reality. Everything is spin. As one journalism scholar described it, “We’re 
all post-modern now.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Jury and the Common Good: Fusing the Insights of Modernism 
and Postmodernism, in FOR THE COMMON GOOD: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 312, 
 19 
 
phase of American democracy, as some historians claim.115 Whatever the explanation, audiences 
give decreasing credibility to true, “expert” journalists and increasing credibility to those, like 
Glenn Beck, who lack formal training in journalistic standards.116 On the other hand, perceptions 
of source credibility rise with those whom we know personally or with sources that we use 
routinely, so reports from social networking sites and familiar blogs get much credence.117 The 
overall tendency is to turn previously professional reporting into showmanship.118 As 
infotainment rises and the audience for serious reporting declines, resources shift as well away 
from investigative and critical journalism toward high-tech fluff.119 We live on the artificial 
pabulum called news while our critical senses become dulled. 
III. The Decline of Deep Thought and of Empathy  
A. The Basic Argument 
Indeed, our capacity for sustained critical thought might itself be at risk.120 What tasks we 
use our brains to accomplish affects the structure of our brains.121 Certain oft-used neuronal 
connections become easier, faster, increasing in number and complexity, while others 
infrequently used wither.122 These changes in connections make some tasks easier and more 
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probable, others harder, less likely.123 The human brain’s natural state is probably one of 
distractedness124, “rapidly and involuntarily shifting attention to salient visual features of 
potential importance.”125 In particular, we became acutely sensitive to environmental changes so 
that predators could not surprise us or food sources escape us.126 Environmental and cultural 
changes required acts of will to overcome these tendencies and develop the capacity for 
sustained thought.127 British research psychologist Vaughn Bell thus declares that “[t]he ability 
to focus on a single task, relatively uninterrupted … [is] a strange anomaly in the history of our 
psychological development.”128 Close reading of books especially required intense 
concentration, getting lost in a book meaning that readers “made their own associations, drew 
their own inferences and analogies, fostered their own ideas. They thought deeply as they read 
deeply.”129 
Net reading returns us to the practiced distractedness of an earlier evolutionary era.130 
Hyperlinks break information into chunks, permitting a multi-sensory experience.131 The content 
displayed on the computer screen fragments our attention as we shift from video to word, to 
audio, often using all simultaneously.132 Links permit jumping from one bit of information to 
another bit without the necessity for careful synthesis.133 Searchability decreases our incentives 
to take a work in as a whole as the scraps of information we seek for instrumental reasons 
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become easy to find rapidly.134 Skimming replaces close reading, a phenomenon observed even 
among academics.135 Indeed, the rise of e-readers like the Kindle, the Nook, and the iPad, which 
allow net surfing during reading and heighten book searchability, are likely to accelerate these 
trends. Even author Steven Johnson, a staunch defender of the advantages of the brain changes 
wrought by modern technology,136 worries that “one of the great joys of book reading – the total 
immersion in another world, or in the world of the author’s ideas – will be compromised. We all 
may read books the way we increasingly read magazines and newspapers: a little bit here, a little 
bit there.”137   
Researchers have found that the “repetitive, intensive, interactive, addictive” use of the 
internet promotes particularly rapid brain changes.138 The net seizes but scatters our attention 
rapidly and repeatedly.139 Unlike interruptions of periods of sustained thought, which permit rest 
and renewal, constant distractedness harms more than hurts our sustained critical thinking 
skills.140 In one study, it took just five hours of novices learning to use the internet for their 
brains to rewire in ways making them virtually indistinguishable from those of experienced 
users.141   
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More areas of the brain are active when we use the net than when we engage in deep 
reading.142 But this occurs precisely because multi-tasking requires use of many brain areas but 
in a shallow way.143 Long-term memory is not merely the brain’s filing system but also the home 
of “complex concepts, or schemas,” the “seat of understanding.”144 “We are able to understand 
concepts in our areas of expertise because we have schemas associated with those concepts,” 
explains educational psychologist John Sweller.145  The deep concentration involved in uni-
tasking allows the small amount of data stored in short-term memory to make its way into long-
term memory, enhancing schema formation.146 But high cognitive load interferes with schema 
formation, leaving our understanding shallow. Likewise, high cognitive load makes it harder for 
us to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information.147  
Indeed, though the results of the research are not uniform, the preponderance of the research 
evidence is that hypertext readers understand less than linear readers.148 The high cognitive load 
involved in the former weakens “establishing relationships between concepts, drawing 
inferences, activating prior knowledge, and synthesizing main ideas.”149  
Importantly, multi-media presentations can be organized to aid understanding. But they must 
be carefully designed to be effective, as educational psychologists have shown.150 For example, 
auditory and visual memory are sufficiently distinct that using both simultaneously can under the 
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right circumstances actually increase effective working memory.151 On the other hand, multiple 
demands making use of the same memory system, such as multiple visual stimuli, interfere with 
working memory.152 But the common internet user is not an educational psychologist. Moreover, 
effective multimedia presentations minimize interruptions, precisely the opposite of what 
happens in the networked life.153 Cognitive switching between just two tasks, much less three or 
four, short-circuits real understanding, the evidence reveals.154 
Browsing and scanning can be effective ways to identify information for further, deeper 
study. Too often, however, the browsing and scanning becomes an excuse for broad but 
superficial reasoning.155 Concludes Jordan Grafman, the head of the National Institute of 
Neurological Disorders’ cognitive neuroscience unit, “’The more you multitask, the less 
deliberative you become; the less able to think and reason out a problem.’”156 Conformity rises 
too as you “rely on conventional ideas and solutions rather than challenging them with original 
lines of thought.”157 In sum,  
The mental functions that are losing the “survival of the busiest” 
brain cell battle are those that support calm, linear thought -- the ones 
we use in traversing a lengthy narrative or an involved argument, the 
ones we draw on when we reflect on our experiences or contemplate an 
outward or inward phenomenon. The winners are those functions that 
help us speedily locate, categorize, and assess disparate bits of 
information in a variety of forms, that let us maintain our mental 
bearings while being bombarded by stimuli. These functions are, not 
coincidentally, very similar to the ones performed by computers, which 
are programmed for the high-speed transfer of information. Once again, 
we seem to be taking on the characteristics of a popular new 
intellectual technology.158  
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If it is true that our capacity for critical thought is, on average, being compromised by our 
technology while that same technology makes us respond to media more with heart than head, it 
becomes increasingly hard to see how the bulk of our population can effectively spot the flaws in 
media news coverage, particularly of such an emotionally radioactive topic like crime. 
B. Criticisms and Caveats 
There are three major criticisms that can be made of the argument that there is a decline 
in critical thought. None of these three undercuts my argument. 
First, brain changes come from practice, so we can simply require people to practice deep 
thought.159 Indeed, one leading cognitive psychologist has argued that teaching that capacity is 
the whole point of a university education.160 There is thus no reason for despair. As an academic, 
I certainly am not going to challenge the value of a university education. Nevertheless, there is 
an elitism here that is worrisome. The majority of our population still does not receive a 
university education.161 Many who study beyond high school may attend two-year community 
colleges or hone very specific job skills not particularly requiring mastery of deep analytical 
thinking.162 If this critic is right, there is a new kind of digital divide arising: that between 
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citizens most capable of serious critical thought and those far less capable.163 For deep reading 
and sharp critical skills to become the “province of a small and dwindling elite”164 cannot be a 
good thing for democracy. 
Furthermore, if children are raised in a multitasking, multimedia world, it is not so clear 
that simply insisting on deep reading, even at the university level, will work. Students must first 
be engaged, and long lectures, class discussion of assigned materials, even Power Point slides, 
are no longer enough to do the job.165 Frustrated professors indeed increasingly experiment with 
multimedia books to replace the linear ones of yesteryear as one effort to re-engage their young 
audiences – and this occurs even at the graduate level.166 Grade inflation, the absence of many 
long papers, and the ability to paste together ideas found from combing the net may mean that 
most university students get along just fine without intensive, uni-tasking studying.167 Most law 
professors can attest that the bulk of first-year students do not arrive with a mastery of analytical 
thinking.168 In any event, the bulk of jurors in most areas of the country – our ultimate concern 
here -- will not be the product of four-year, high-quality university educations.169 
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Indeed, the second criticism has two parts: (a) the cognitive losses are not so bad; and (b) 
we simply cannot effectively teach this and upcoming generations without buying into their 
lifelong habits of scattered thinking.170 We must join them rather than fight them. The first part 
of this argument relies on research showing that certain kinds of multitasking may slow learning 
but do not make it less effective.171 However, time is finite in and outside the classroom, and 
slower learning is a high cost to pay. Furthermore, much of this research [correct?] focuses on 
memorization, the raw retention of information, rather than the higher-level critical skills that I 
focus upon here.172 Additionally, these critics concede that properly-designed multitasking is 
important, such as trying to avoid simultaneous tugs on similar types of processing, such as 
visual processing.173  
The second portion of this argument has more force. It probably is necessary to use social 
networking; properly structured multimedia presentations; more active learning; and greater 
multisensory, more realistic simulations as ways to engage students and improve their 
learning.174 Indeed, such changes in teaching style may make it easier to prod students toward 
deeper learning. But most teachers at most levels have not made such changes, indeed are not yet 
aware of the need for such changes.175 It may be many years before such changes occur, 
resistance by those wedded to old ways is likely, and experimentation in the field will be needed 
for some time to come to improve these ways of teaching. To make the case for change, 
however, the critics point out how untutored net users – the vast bulk of the net population – 
currently are so poor at analytical reasoning, even in using the net.176  
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For example, researchers have discovered that elementary schoolchildren lack the ability 
to assess the credibility, relevance, and weight of numerous sources identified via websites.177 
But the same has proven to be true with college students. In one study nearly half of college 
students used only the first five links on an internet research project.178 Only fifteen percent used 
the first ten links, twelve percent all the links on the first page, three percent links beyond the 
first three pages.179 Yet educators agreed that looking further was “necessary to find the best and 
most reliable information.”180Other experimenters found that college students most trusted the 
first links appearing in a search even when less relevant than later ones.181 College students 
generally tend not to distinguish among the credibility of sources and uncritically to accept what 
appears on a website, though much of it is “unverified, unsubstantiated thoughts and 
opinions….”182 Blogs are especially troublesome because, unlike traditional journalists’ work 
product, they do not pass through several editors’ hands, nor are they required to meet 
journalistic evidentiary standards.183  
Indeed, the more young people use the internet, the more credible they believe it to be. 
They find particularly credible sites containing information that interests them or in which they 
are invested.184 Moreover, website users generally, regardless of age, are insufficiently skeptical 
of information that they find on the web.185 Very few in one study were “extremely concerned,” 
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willing to look outside the website specifically to explore the credibility of its authors or the 
accuracy of its information.186   
Net users make heaviest use of those sources that they trust most,187 that is, that 
seemingly display honesty (keeping one’s word), benevolence (not trying to mislead), and 
competence (accuracy).188 But, in descending order, users place the greatest trust in peer 
recommendations (by far the highest), on-line consumer opinions, editorial content, brand 
websites and sponsorships, and television – more trust than in traditional, edited newspaper 
reporting, though being quite distrustful of most forms of advertising.189 
Individual differences matter, with those generally more trusting of people also being 
more trusting of websites.190 But people seem indiscriminately to trust expert and non-expert 
sources alike.191 Yet, “[s]ources that look professional, contain a wide variety of material, and 
are used by many have source credibility but may lack real credibility.”192 In one study of 
perceived website trustworthiness, almost half the respondents preferred and trusted Wikipedia 
over other sources of information when asked where they would go to research a specific 
topic.193  
Commentators urging educators to embrace net learning styles thus simultaneously stress 
the importance of training net users from a young age in such simple concepts as that media 
images have points of view, are not always accurate, may reflect differing opinions, are targeted 
to different populations of people, and often exist to make money or serve some other specific 
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agenda.194 Furthermore, users must be trained to explore net authors’ credentials and credibility; 
to search for peer-reviewed sources to back up on-line claims; to use print sources where on-line 
ones are incomplete, unavailable, or potentially inaccurate; to distinguish observations from 
opinion; and to uncover sources of bias.195 These skills must be taught at higher educational 
levels too because college students similarly lack adequate net literacy.196  
Third, IQ scores have risen steadily, so, to the extent that they are an accurate measure of 
intelligence – a questionable claim – intelligence arguably does not seem to have suffered from 
the rise of the internet.197 But there has in fact been little, if any, improvement in the portions of 
the test involving memory, math, general knowledge, or vocabulary. The improvement has come 
primarily in tests involving mentally rotating objects, finding similarities among them, and 
arranging them into logical sequences.198 Moreover, verbal scores on other measures of 
intellectual skill, such as the PSAT and the SAT have declined.199 Even IQ scores have started 
falling in many Western nations since the 1990s.200 Overall intelligence is a hard concept to 
measure, perhaps not a valid one at all.201 Consequently, these measures may reveal nothing 
more than a changing of our brains, a switching from deeper thinking skills to more shallow ones 
in a way that does not overall dramatically affect IQ measures.202 But the new net-brain is neither 
better nor worse than its predecessors, no what IQ and other scores say. The new brain is simply 
different, with its own strengths and weaknesses.203 Among those weaknesses, unfortunately, is a 
                                               
194
 See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 172-73. 
195
 See id. at 2522-78. 
196
 See id. at 2573-92. 
197
 See CARR, supra note 120, at 144-45 (discussing rising IQ scores); NISBETT, supra note162, at 44 (challenging 
IQ measures); STANOVICH, supra note 162, at 1-7 (similar). 
198
 See CARR, supra note 120, at 145. 
199
 See id. at 145-46.  
200
 See id. at 146. 
201
 See STANOVICH, supra note 162, at 45. 
202
 See CARR, supra note 120, at 145-48. 
203
 See id. at 148. 
 30 
 
greater difficulty with the deeper, analytical thinking necessary to viewing news reports and 
images skeptically and with an open mind. 
C. Declining Empathy 
Up until now, I have spoken as if there is a sharp, unbridgeable difference between 
emotions and cognitions. In fact, there are generally differences in degrees, differences 
substantial enough in relevant ways here to justify my writing as if the two processes were 
dichotomous. They are not.204 For example, to fear spiders, you must first conclude that they are 
dangerous – a conclusion that I personally had rejected until being hospitalized after receiving a 
brown recluse spider bite.205 The thought triggers and is in some sense part of the emotion.206 
Empathy is often thought of as an emotion and a positive one at that. But it need not be so 
viewed. Empathy, properly understood, is the ability to stand in another person’s shoes, to see 
and feel the world through their eyes.207 Empathy requires the exercise of imagination, and the 
accuracy of empathy also requires information about another’s life experiences and current 
situation.208 Empathy is a form of speculative mind reading.209 Once we have read the other’s 
mind, however, that may trigger both thoughts and feelings. We may be horrified by what we 
find, or at least judge the other’s thoughts, emotions, and thus resulting actions worthy of 
censure.210 Alternatively, we may resonate with the other’s heart and mind, feeling sympathy for 
his plight, wanting to reduce his suffering, even if he deserves some of it.211 Accuracy in judging 
others therefore requires accuracy in empathy. 
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Yet there is at least some reason to worry that empathy is becoming more scarce. One 
recent major study found this year’s college graduates the least empathetic in decades based 
upon standard psychological measures.212 If that conclusion is accurate, there could be many 
reasons for that decline. But the net and modern media likely have much to do with it.213 Media 
increasingly portray violence as “cool, gratifying, fun, and without consequences.”214 Various 
studies have concluded that exposure to media violence reduces empathy.215 Even worse, 
consumers are unaware of this effect.216 One study found that those who just finished playing a 
violent video game were less likely to help a person being hurt in their presence.217 Other studies 
found the brain activity of violent video game users consistent with reduced sensitivity to the 
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suffering of others.218 Still other brain studies reveal the release of dopamine in violent video 
game users, linking violence therefore with pleasure of an addictive nature.219 The Mind Science 
Foundation,220 in studying television violence, reported that watching such violence  
recruits a network of brain regions involved in the regulation of 
emotion, arousal and attention, episodic memory encoding and 
retrieval, and motor programming. This pattern of brain activations 
may explain  the behavioral effects observed in many studies, 
especially the finding that children who are frequent viewers of TV 
violence are more likely to behave aggressively. Such extensive 
viewing may result in a large number of aggressive scripts stored in 
long-term memory in the posterior singulate, which facilitates rapid 
recall of aggressive scenes that serve as a guide for overt social 
behavior.221  
Moreover, noted these researchers, although the game players were aware that the violence was 
not real, their brains reacted as if it were real.222 
Mirror neurons, discussed earlier, are essential to empathy.223 Those neurons are more 
likely to fire, however, when we are interacting with someone whom we perceive as similar to 
us.224 Despite improvements, media stereotyping of racial minorities continues.225  Even if equal 
numbers of Blacks and Whites are shown engaging in violence on television, most Whites have 
little close contact with Blacks, certainly few Black friends.226 Whites will thus know other 
Whites who are nonviolent, but most Whites’ image of Blacks will come primarily from the 
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media.227 Exposure to images of Black violence takes its toll.228 In video game studies, “the 
presence of an African American male video game character primed (brought to mind) the 
concept of violence.”229 Fear of the other and perceived difference from him make empathy hard, 
in turn making sympathy hard, even where it is deserved.230 
Storytelling, as also noted earlier, has special power. Yet both fictional media and news 
media necessarily engage in narrative.231 But, “[w]hen you get lost in a story, you become 
uncritical of the persuasive messages embedded in the story, accepting them involuntarily.”232 
Mere descriptions of someone as dangerous therefore have far less impact than story-embedded 
images, “such as when an African American man in a video game is portrayed as a street 
criminal.”233 Concludes social psychologist Karen Dill, “Since we don’t differentiate between 
stereotypes we’ve just imagined and those we’ve seen confirmed in real life, then surely we 
don’t differentiate between real people who confirm a stereotype and fictional characters who 
do.”234 Media tales thus particularly create obstacles to empathy. 
Self-control, patience, and deferred gratification are also central to empathy. In repeated 
experiments over decades, children displaying the least self-control were more likely than other 
children to become bullies, get poor teacher evaluations, and abuse drugs.235 Self-control was 
related to attentional control. Children who could shift their attention away from the desired 
object to other thoughts for extended periods were better able to control their behavior.236 Self-
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control thus seems linked to the ability to focus on others than one’s self. Self-control is enabled 
by sustained, focused attention, thus permitting long-term planning, information-gathering, 
engagement with others in ways that enable connection.237 Social learning and caring thus turn 
on uni-focusing. Science journalist Maggie Jackson makes the point eloquently: 
Attention … tames our inner beast. Primates that receive 
training in attention become less aggressive. One of attention’s highest 
forms is “effortful control,” ... the ability to shift focus deliberately, 
engage in planning, and regulate one’s impulses. Six-and-seven-year-
olds who score high in tests of this skill are more empathetic, better 
able to feel guilt and shame, and less aggressive. Moreover, effortful 
control is integral to developing a conscience, researchers are 
discovering. In order to put back the stolen cookie, you must attend to 
your uneasy feelings, the action itself, and the abstract moral principles 
– then make the right response. All in all, attention is key to both our 
free will as individuals and our ability to subordinate ourselves to a 
greater good.238  
The multi-tasking, distracting, interruption-filled life of modernity does not keep citizens 
practiced in this form of focused social attention. Perhaps that is why so many Americans, even 
the young, may report many weak social ties but few strong ones.239  Yet without skill at 
focused, particularly face-to-face, social attention, empathy suffers.240 There are surely many 
other forces affecting whether we can empathize with another in a particular case,241 and the 
immersion in concrete evidence at a criminal trial may arguably force jurors to pay closer 
attention to the person they are judging.242 But most suspects will be racial minorities, class 
minorities,243 portrayed as “them,” not “us” in the media,244 already creating obstacles to 
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empathy and fear of the purported offender.245 Scattered attention spans may amplify the 
problem. There is thus at least good reason to worry that news audiences for crime stories will 
have every motivation to absorb those stories uncritically, to favor the negative ones portraying 
the suspect in a bad light, and to avoid the effort to understand his life circumstances or to see the 
other side. Those risks may not fully abate when some of those audiences members sit in his 
judgment as jurors.246 
D. Gossip, Rumors, and the Net 
1. False Net Rumors and How They Spread 
Remember that net users consider two sources of information extremely credible: people they 
already know or sites that they frequently use with some emotional investment in them.247 This 
observation matters greatly when we recognize that most news and opinion about it is spread by 
rumor, defined here roughly as the spread of unverified information.248 In the pre-internet world, 
friends, neighbors, and colleagues gossiped about much, including local crime stories. That, of 
course, still happens. But the internet magnifies the speed and impact with which those rumors 
can spread.249 
Because rumors are unverified, it can be hard to separate the true wheat from the false 
chaff.250 Rumor propagators have many motives, however, to spread false, misleading, or 
incomplete information, consciously or not. Such motives include narrow self-interest (making 
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money, beating the competition), general self-interest in the sense of attracting eyeballs to 
websites, altruism (promoting a social cause), and malice (injuring another for the sheer joy of 
it.)251 On the net, a rumor posted on a blog with even a small readership gets picked up by one 
blog, then another, then another, until finally even making it to the local news.252 Rumors can 
spread in similar fashion through social networking sites.253 
Three effects in particular aid the spread of rumor. First, informational cascades.254 The idea 
here is simply that you hear a rumor, have no personal knowledge of its accuracy, but you see 
many other people propagating it. Accordingly, you assume that so many people cannot be 
wrong, so you accept the rumor’s truth and spread it further.255 Even if you have some counter-
information, the sheer number of people accepting the rumor may cause you to lack confidence 
in your initial judgments. You defer to the will of the group.256  
Second, and relatedly, conformity cascades may arise.257 These are similar to informational 
cascades but the primary motive is not doubt in the accuracy of one’s own knowledge base but 
rather the desire to conform to a group.258 Experiments reveal that people will even express 
belief in information whose accuracy they doubt to avoid feared social sanctions.259 Explains law 
professor Cass Sunstein: 
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Rumors often spread as a result of conformity cascades, which are 
especially important in social networks made up of tightly knit groups 
or in which there is a strong stake in a certain set of beliefs. In a 
conformity cascade, people go along with the group in order to 
maintain the good opinion of others – no matter their private views or 
doubts.260  
Thus if A and B are far-left liberals and A tells B that a well-known Republican Senator is 
taking graft, B may profess belief in that rumor. She may do so even if she privately doubts its 
truth because she wants to avoid A’s hostility or lessened esteem of her or that of her other far-
left friends.261  
Third, group polarization, discussed above, plays a role.262 Widespread discussion within a 
group leads to more extreme versions of the originally-held beliefs. Social networks, including 
via networking sites, magnify the effect because they increase corroboration by the like-minded 
and heighten concerns about maintaining a strong reputation among other community 
members.263 Polarization intensifies not only the cognitive strength of beliefs but also their 
emotional importance to us, often leading to anger.264 Consequently, deliberation often prompts 
aggressive protest action, even including supporting marches and sit-ins.265 Such action itself 
enhances polarization while gaining still more attention for the initiating rumor.266 
Different groups have different likelihoods of initially believing a rumor, primarily based 
upon whether it is consistent or inconsistent with the group’s prior beliefs.267 Consistency with 
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prior convictions promotes belief, inconsistency its opposite.268 One group thus has a low 
threshold for believing a rumor, another a higher threshold.269 Yet if the low-threshold group is 
big enough, and if other low-threshold groups catch on, eventually the total group may be large 
enough for even higher threshold groups to accept the rumor’s truth and propagate it further.270 
2. Raced Effects 
Rumors that are consistent with pre-existing attitudes, including toward racial group 
members, are more likely to be believed.271 For example, rumors about black criminality, 
stupidity, and sexual aggression are more readily accepted by white audiences than the 
converse.272 In the mid 1960s, a rumor circulated in Detroit, Michigan, falsely alleging that a 
child was castrated by a gang of teenage boys in a shopping mall restroom. “When repeated in 
the White community, the gang was said to be Black and the victim White. When told in the 
Black community, the gang was said to be White and the victim Black.”273  
Rumor-repetition also increases its acceptance. The mere re-telling of a similar story can thus 
encourage its spread, particularly if not rebutted by equally credible sources.274 Likewise, the 
various other biases recounted above that degrade rumor accuracy in the telling--information-
filters, confirmation biases, in-group aggrandizement, among others--probably promote 
acceptance and repetition of stereotype-consistent rumors.275  
In any given instance, of course, a variety of forces can be at work, some promoting rumor 
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accuracy, others undermining it. But what this review of illustrative factors encouraging the 
latter does is to point out how racial stereotyping can raise the risk of inaccurate rumors being 
believed, particularly under certain conditions.276  
3. Difficulties of Responding 
More speech will not necessarily correct false net rumors. The joint presence of three factors  
makes it particularly unlikely that counter-speech will change false beliefs: (1) strong prior 
beliefs, (2) skewed trust toward the rumor source, and (3) weak prior knowledge.277 Many 
audience members will have strong prior beliefs about crime, mostly ones that work against the 
accused, as has been extensively demonstrated elsewhere.278 The media exaggeration of crime 
frequency and severity to catch audience attention, explained earlier, creates a perception of our 
society as a dangerous one populated by human-appearing predators.279 Racial stereotypes 
trigger fears of offenders.280 Despite the presumption of innocence, too many people assume that 
someone arrested must be guilty or dangerous, even if the innocence movement has made some 
inroads into these attitudes.281 Crimes stories also help to create social solidarity in a rapidly-
changing, oft-frightening world.282 The stories promote shared values and a common perceived 
enemy.283 
On the other hand, most of us have little prior knowledge about specific criminal cases. We 
glean our knowledge from rumor, friends, websites, social networking sites, and media outlets.284 
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We are unlikely to do independent investigation in most cases, and only the rare person had 
eyewitness knowledge of the events in a specific case.285 Our ignorance makes it likely that we 
will rely on trusted others.286 
Rumors from friends or frequently-visited sites are treated as coming from trusted others.287 
Website reports are too-readily accepted uncritically.288 Beliefs in rumor truth, including about 
crime stories, will form early.289 Moreover, because law enforcement has access to most of the 
information early in a case, even the true information available will tend to favor conviction.290 
Beliefs once formed mightily resist change, even in the face of starkly contradicting evidence. 
Indeed, audiences suspect that merely trying to rebut a story shows that you have something to 
hide and that the prior-belief-inconsistent source is likely not credible.291 Self-deception, 
rationalization, and filtering processes lead to judging the new evidence as implausible or 
confused.292 Moreover, trying to rebut a prior belief simply re-focuses attention on that belief, 
often perversely increasing the strength with which it is held.293 Only if special sets of 
circumstances are present, such as the belief-inconsistent information itself coming from trusted 
sources that first defended the initial belief, will counter-speech likely be effective.294 
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Negative, vivid rumors are also more likely to spread and stay – to be “sticky” -- than are 
positive, more abstract ones.295 Rumors triggering strong emotions, such as disgust, anger, or 
outrage, spread more rapidly and resist counter-information more effectively than more pallid, 
positive information.296 This too can contribute to selective perception of the disgusting and evil, 
selective inattention to the opposite.297 The media is aware of this phenomenon, thus more likely 
to spread the negative in the first place.298 But horribly vivid crime stories will mean that positive 
messages will face selective inattention.299 
Rumors need not be false to inflict grave harm. If the state truthfully summarizes information 
it will present via the story as it sees it and the defense does the same, the state’s story under the 
circumstances just noted will be stickier than the defense’s. An incomplete tale can be a 
misleading one. Moreover, so much of what happens at trial is not about the evidence but about 
its interpretation.300 It can be hard to label one interpretation “false,” another true.301 Yet the 
same forces can skew average public perception of a reported criminal case in favor of one 
interpretation over another well before a jury has been empanelled.302  
4. Jurors and the Media 
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The dominant view among research psychologists is that pretrial publicity has negative 
effects, generally ones working against defendants.303 Persons exposed to media crime stories 
tend toward pro-prosecution bias.304 Publicity conveying factually probative, incriminating 
information, such as whether a defendant confessed, plays into this bias in a particular case.305 
Emotional publicity casting the defendant in a bad light, though relevant to some issue other than 
the wrongdoer’s identity, also favors conviction.306 Reports of a defendant’s bad character can do 
much damage to audience fairness, especially revelations of a prior record, which foster 
perceptions of the suspect as a “typical criminal.”307 Pretrial publicity has its greatest effect on 
individuals lacking strong prejudgments about guilt in the individual case or strong case-relevant 
attitudes (for example, about the likelihood of “real rape”) and when the prosecution’s case is 
weak.308   
 Once negative reactions set in, new evidence tends to be viewed through a pro-
prosecution lens.309 Field and laboratory research converge on similar results.310 However, a 
“combination of prejudicial information – such as the seriousness of the offense, the race of the 
accused, unfavorable statements by a prosecutor, a confession, and retention in custody – is more 
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likely to result in a guilty verdict than any one item presented in isolation.”311 Pretrial publicity 
increases juror recall of anti-defendant information, biases its interpretation against the defendant 
still further, and enhances pre-existing negative attitudes, “for example, that fraternities promote 
licentiousness.”312 The heinous nature of the crime, media focus on an individual defendant 
rather than a class of defendants, and high credibility of the source – and on crime reports in 
individual cases, the media may be given much credibility – are also factors favoring 
conviction.313 
The current Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”), of course, prohibit 
prosecutors from conveying to the media several of the most damaging categories of pre-trial 
information.314 Yet prosecutor compliance is erratic. Thus one content analysis of fourteen 
newspapers revealed that twenty-seven percent of media-identified criminal suspects in news 
stories revealed information violative of the MRPC prohibitions.315 This study concluded that the 
“most common types of publicly revealed information were negative statements about the 
suspect, prior arrest information, opinions of guilt, confessions, and prior conviction 
information.”316 Although the media may obtain this information through many sources, the 
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study revealed that “[l]aw enforcement officers and prosecutors were often the sources of 
prejudicial information to the newspapers.”317 Another, more recent content analysis reached 
similar conclusions but also explored racial bias.318 That study found that “African-Americans 
and Latinos were twice as likely as Whites to be described in prejudicial ways that violated the 
ABA standards.”319  
There is a dispute about the size of the pretrial publicity effects. Pessimists find a great 
effect size. Optimists see a much smaller effect size.320 Yet even the optimists’ reports of small 
effect sizes can make a big difference in close cases. In such cases, juries that are just below the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold need their confidence in conviction raised only a bit to 
cross over into the zone of conviction.321 Presumably very strong cases would result in 
conviction even without bad publicity and very weak ones will not be revived from the dead by 
publicity alone.322 If that presumption is correct, most such cases should result in guilty pleas 
rather than trials. Pretrial publicity thus matters most in those cases worthy of debate and likely 
to go to trial, even under the (contested) conclusions of the minority pessimists. 
Pessimists and optimists also disagree over the likely success of remedies for pretrial 
publicity. Pessimists, again in the majority, find most available remedies ineffective.323 Voir dire 
does not work, partly because potential jurors may honestly but erroneously declare that they can 
be fair.324 Persons are also often unaware of the effect of various factors on their tendency to 
                                               
317
 Id.  
318
 See T.L. Dixon & D. Linz, Television News, Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity, and the Depiction of Race, 46 J. 
BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA 112, 114-15, 117-18 (2002). 
319
 Lieberman, supra note 304, at 71. 
320
 See Taslitz, Free Press, supra note 3, at 186-90. 
321
 See id. at 190. 
322
 See id. 
323
 See id. at 187-89. 
324
 See Lieberman, supra note 304, at 69. 
 45 
 
convict. They do not know themselves.325 There is even some evidence that merely asking 
potential jurors about pretrial biasing information can in fact heighten its biasing effects.326 
Peremptory challenges run out quickly, leaving either side little effective remedy in voir dire.327 
Jury instructions to disregard pretrial publicity are similarly generally ineffective.328 The 
ineffectiveness can, however, perhaps be moderated by contextual factors, such as strong pro-
prosecution evidence or giving jurors a persuasive, logical reason to believe the previously-
revealed information to be unreliable.329 Some researchers believe that deliberation can reduce 
the effects of inadmissible evidence within a juror’s awareness.330 Yet the more prevalent view is 
that “deliberations actually tend to increase the effect of publicity on jurors,”331 probably again 
because of group polarization.332 Moreover, the overwhelming consensus is one of general 
distrust of admonitions as a means for combating pretrial publicity effects.333  Admonitions 
likely fail because of belief perseverance (processing future information consistently with the 
original belief), the backfire effect (paying more attention to what you are told to ignore), 
hindsight bias (the inability, once being told of information, to alter one’s beliefs to what they 
were before you were exposed to the information), and reactance (giving more weight to what 
you are told to ignore because of resentment at an effort to limit your autonomy).334  
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Researchers disagree on the effects of long continuances. There is some reason to believe 
that the press moderates its reports over a long time period.335 There is also research suggesting 
that the impact on the public diminishes over time.336 But there is contrary evidence that the 
impact increases with time.337 
Change of venue can be difficult and works only if press coverage did not reach the new 
venue.338 That seems increasingly less likely in a world where internet communication can 
spread stories rapidly around the globe.339  
Optimists disagree concerning remedy effectiveness in one way. The optimists point out 
that most studies examined the impact of remedies one at a time.340 Optimists instead embrace 
the “cumulative remedies hypothesis,” that is, that “careful voir dire, effective defense counsel, 
cautionary instructions, jury deliberation, and presentation of trial-evidence under real-world 
conditions should cumulatively minimize or even entirely erase media coverage’s negative 
effects.”341 Yet pessimists concede that their argument rests partly on improvements in how each 
of these remedies are currently administered, improvements that would seem unlikely to be 
rapidly adopted.342 In any event, the combination of all these remedies in the real world seems a 
lot to ask for (guaranteeing effective defense counsel in an under-resourced criminal justice 
system is alone a challenge).343 Moreover, the wisdom of the optimists’ assertion awaits further 
research.344 
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The bottom line is that jury research is consistent with the likely ill impacts of pretrial 
publicity discussed throughout this piece. The net-related-effects described in earlier sections of 
this article suggest that pretrial publicity effects will worsen, not improve, as younger 
generations age and technology advances. The only sure-fire way to protect against the ill effects 
of pretrial publicity on criminal trials is to bar it entirely, a non-starter in our constitutional 
culture.345 
IV. Conclusion 
There is much to like in the new standard on prosecutors’ dealing with the media. I have 
written elsewhere on the need for current standards to address the risks of harm to reputation, not 
only to a fair trial.346 The new standard does just that.347 Prosecutors must therefore be cautious 
with the press even for cases that are ultimately dismissed or result in guilty pleas, and even 
where a fair trial seems possible but certain information-dissemination creates risks of 
unnecessarily harming reputation, including harming it more than would (and before) the simple 
fact of conviction itself. Although both the old and the new core standard protect not only the 
fairness of trials but of “criminal proceedings,”348 thus also arguably extending to guilty pleas, 
the new standard more properly and more broadly adds a focus not only on prejudice to such 
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proceedings but to undue (“unnecessary”) harm to reputation (or, in the standard’s words, to 
heightened “public condemnation”) and is thus to be applauded.349 
 The new standard also has other provisions that discourage continuation of prosecution 
contact with the media “off the record” or even where the prosecutor is not involved in the 
particular high-profile case on which she comments if that improperly risks an unfair trial or 
otherwise risks materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding.350 That discourages end-runs 
around the core provision guarding the right to a fair trial.351 Similarly, there are new provisions 
generally barring prosecutors from emotion-heightening demonstrations or re-creations for the 
media of any pending case, including ones in which the prosecutor is not directly involved.352 
Nor may the prosecutor allow her judgment to be influenced by the personal or career benefits of 
involving the media.353 These provisions offer details that improve upon the current standard’s 
textual silence on these matters. 
But the standard’s core provision protecting the right to a fair trial (and other stages of a 
criminal proceeding), on which I have focused here, is troubling. One minor point is that it does 
not define “prejudice” to a criminal proceeding. In the sixth amendment effective assistance of 
counsel area, prejudice means either likely to alter the case outcome or to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.354 That seems like a sensible standard and, if applied here, would negate any 
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need to talk of “material” prejudice. Although commentary may clear up the matter, I cannot see 
what point the addition of the materiality language to the existing rule serves other than as a 
signal that it should be harder to find prejudice than is the case under the current rule. 
The more important problem, however, is not with the materiality or prejudice language 
but with the retention of the core standard barring prosecutor statements raising a “substantial 
likelihood” of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding. What I have argued here is that there 
is strong reason to worry that any press coverage of a high-profile case raises a substantial risk of 
such prejudice. Furthermore, I have insisted that this risk is likely to rise in the future because of 
quickening technological and resulting cultural change. Specifically, our high-information-
overload, multi-tasking lifestyle encourages decision making by the general public based more 
on emotion than reason. Moreover, computer technology, with all its many advantages, 
discourages deep, sustained, critical thinking unless there is a strong motivation to do so or the 
audience receives special training in doing so, both unlikely to occur with the audience in most 
high-profile cases.  
That same technology, though this point is more speculative, may be reducing the ease 
with which most people are able to experience empathy, yet empathy is a cognitive prerequisite 
to accurately and fairly judging another. You must in particular understand another person’s 
nature and situation before you can make such value-laden, interpretive judgments as defining 
what his mental state was at the time of the crime.355 Additionally, the web’s speed and breadth 
exacerbate the many dangers that rumor-mongering poses to trial fairness. Yet news always 
spreads, and faces reinterpretation by, the rumor-dissemination process. Finally, research on the 
impact of pretrial publicity on trial fairness seems consistent with the dangers noted here. 
Granted, some forms of publicity are more dangerous than others. But even such facts as the race 
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of the suspects, the neighborhoods from which they hail, and other matters not specifically 
prohibited by the standards, new or proposed, or even prohibited by current ABA ethics 
disciplinary rules, can pose substantial risks to trial fairness.356 
Yet, despite these concerns, this flawed standard may, as a practical matter, be as good as 
it can get. Notably, the United States offers capacious free speech protection far beyond that of 
most other nations, even when the right to a fair trial is involved.357 Even if the Court sometimes 
writes as if it is finding no substantial danger to trial fairness from pre-trial publicity in particular 
cases, its cases are more sensibly understood as implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) balancing 
free speech rights against trial rights.358 Such balancing is more of a normative question than a 
factual one, though “facts” like the risk posed to a fair trial certainly should enter the balance. 
But the ultimately normative nature of the inquiry means that the risks posed by technology 
cannot justify a flat bar on prosecutors contributing to the risk posed by the press to fair trial 
rights. Words like “substantial” in the standard might indeed best be understood as meaning 
“substantial next to the need for protecting free speech and press rights,” in short, as implying a 
balancing.359 
Additionally, it is not only the constitution but sound policy that favors protecting press 
coverage of the criminal justice system, despite some risk posed to trial fairness. The public in a 
democracy has a right to know how the system works, and the purposes of the criminal law (for 
example, retribution, public education) cannot fully be served if the public is not aware of system 
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processes and outcomes.360 The media may itself distort the message, but it is far too dangerous 
to let the state decide that matter on its own. Although prosecutors are far from the only available 
information sources, they are important information sources. Cutting off media access to them 
entirely seems extreme. 
Furthermore, it is plausible that prosecutors need media access to promote trial fairness to 
the state or to justice. There may be a need to respond to defense use of the media.361 
Alternatively, the press may on its own be painting an unfair picture of events, or the public may 
harbor biases that prosecutor statements may at least arguably be capable of softening.362 
Do not misunderstand me. In an ideal world, when the analysis above is weighed against 
free speech rights, even better approaches than those recited in the proposed standards are 
defensible, as I have argued elsewhere.363 Such alternatives would, for example, adopt a 
principle of non-aggravation – that a prosecutor should make no statement that aggravates the 
unfair prejudice inherent in any media coverage.364 Likewise, each prosecutor would avoid 
certain categories of particularly damaging revelations to the press – likely damage determined 
by social science -- and would even work affirmatively to counter unfair prejudices created by 
the media alone.365 But my experience in participating in roundtables on the proposed standards 
at various locations around the country and in various criminal justice law reform efforts in other 
areas suggests that the current proposed standards may the best that the politics of our time will 
allow. 
The best solution available beyond the text of these standards, therefore, seems to be 
improved prosecutor training, heightening prosecutor aspirations, and building systems of 
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transparency and accountability for prosecutors’ use of the media that fall short of the chilling 
effects of harsh bar discipline, which experience has shown is unlikely to be forthcoming 
anyway.366 The prosecution standards can further these goals by expanding at least the 
commentary, if not the text itself, to caution against the dangers noted here, to further caution 
prosecutors to be conservative in deciding what to tell the press, to offer some useful 
hypotheticals, and to emphasize the importance of training and accountability procedures, both 
internal and external.367 The ABA is also currently working on revising the Fair Press/Free Trial 
standards, and that may be the appropriate place to take the more ambitious step of 
recommending procedural changes in how prosecutors’ offices can improve training, 
transparency, and accountability in this area. This brief piece is not the place to suggest specifics, 
though numerous writers have been addressing prosecutor best practices in internal management 
and external review in other areas that may serve as inspiration.368  
Ultimately, therefore, I conclude that the proposed prosecution media standards do nearly 
as fine a job as can be expected, but they cannot alone be expected to do enough. At a minimum, 
however, later forthcoming commentary to the proposed standards should take into the account 
the matters analyzed here and should try to get the ball rolling for other-needed mechanisms for 
reform. The prosecutors’ duty to “do justice”369 demands no less. 
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